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THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PARADOX 
Neal Devins* 
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE. By David J. Garrow. New York: Mac- 
millan Publishing Co. 1994. Pp. 981. $28. 
In 1970, judicial recognition of abortion rights seemed far- 
fetched. In January of that year, Linda Greenhouse wrote in the 
New York Times Magazine about a "right to abortion" - describ- 
ing "[s]uch a notion ... [as] fantastic, illusory. The Constitution is 
searched in vain for any mention of it. The very phrase rings of the 
rhetoric of a Women's Liberation meeting."' While Greenhouse's 
bit of hyperbole was a setup to one of the first full-blown popular 
press treatments of burgeoning judicial recognition of abortion 
rights, no one could have foreseen the prospect of a sweeping 
Supreme Court decision invalidating forty-six state antiabortion 
laws - at least not in 1970. 
At that time, however, the events leading up to the Supreme 
Court's Roe v. Wade2 decision had already been set in motion. In 
the fall of 1969, Norma McCorvey - a.k.a. Jane Roe - realized 
she was pregnant and sought legal counsel to attack Texas's an- 
tiabortion statute. In June 1970, a three-judge federal district court 
struck down Texas's antiabortion statute on privacy grounds.3 Just 
one year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Roe and 
McCorvey's attorneys - Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington 
were furiously working on their Court briefs. In January 1973, after 
two oral arguments and the additions of Justices Lewis Powell and 
William Rehnquist to the Court, the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Roe sent shock waves throughout the nation. 
How could a decision of such monumental import catch the na- 
tion - including most legal academics - by surprise?4 Was Roe, 
as Robert Bork suggests, a brazen "judicial usurpation of demo- 
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. A.B. 1978, 
Georgetown; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. - Ed. Thanks to Kathy Abrams and Mary Dudziak for 
useful commentary. 
1. Linda J. Greenhouse, Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to Abortion?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1970, ? 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
4. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
151, 170 n.33 (1976). 
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cratic prerogatives"?5 Alternatively, was Roe the inevitable out- 
growth of Griswold v. Connecticut6 - a decision whose 
precedential effect was not realized because it struck down "an un- 
commonly silly law,"7 Connecticut's antiquated ban on the use of 
contraceptives? 
David J. Garrow's Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy 
and the Making of Roe v. Wade8 helps answer these and many 
other questions. Garrow meticulously uncovers the events leading 
up to Griswold and Roe and the deliberations of the Justices and 
their clerks in both cases. While the book - at close to 1000 pages 
- is weighed down by its own thoroughness, Garrow lays bare the 
efforts of reproductive freedom advocates and the Justices sympa- 
thetic to their arguments. 
Despite covering territory that Bernard Schwartz, Mary 
Dudziak, and others have already explored,9 Liberty and Sexuality 
is a strikingly original work. Garrow painstakingly details the 
inner-workings of both the reproductive freedom community and 
the Supreme Court in Griswold and Roe. By interviewing well over 
two hundred individuals who participated in these controversies 
and reading everything and anything connected to these disputes - 
including the case files of former Justices William Brennan, William 
0. Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall - Garrow has provided the 
definitive account of the plaintiffs' side of Griswold and Roe. This 
account, in and of itself, is an extraordinary achievement. 
Liberty and Sexuality seeks to be much more than a history of 
the Griswold and Roe litigation, however. Perceiving the constitu- 
tional right to privacy to be a "basic truth" (p. 705) and Roe to be 
"the legal and moral equivalent of Brown v. Board of Education,"'0 
Liberty and Sexuality seeks to give Roe v. Wade its due as "a 
landmark in the growth of American freedom.""1 Garrow pursues 
his normative ends through two techniques. First, Garrow focuses 
his attention on the reproductive freedom community. By treating 
5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 116 (1990). 
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7. 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
8. David Garrow is a legal historian whose Bearing the Cross won the Pulitzer Prize in 
1987. 
9. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 83- 
151 (1988) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, BURGER COURT]; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUB- 
LISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 227-39 (1985) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, WARREN 
COURT]; Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court 
Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915 (1990); Catherine G. Roraback, Gris- 
wold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 395 (1989). 
10. Michael Anderson, From Civil Rights to Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, 
? 7 (Book Review), at 7 (quoting an interview with David Garrow). 
11. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, News from Macmillan (copy on file with 
author). 
1434 [Vol. 93:1433 
The Countermajoritarian Paradox 
the story of these social activists and lawyers as the one worth tell- 
ing, Garrow - through an evenhanded but generally sympathetic 
portrayal of these individuals - places his readers in the shoes of 
one side of the bitter struggle over abortion. The prolife commu- 
nity, to the extent Garrow considers it, is typically portrayed in less 
sympathetic terms.12 For Garrow, who - in promoting Liberty and 
Sexuality - has described Operation Rescue as "really beyond the 
pale in just the same way the Klan is,"'3 the prolife community is 
principally viewed as an obstacle on the path toward the achieve- 
ment of liberty. 
Garrow's second technique is purely factual. Specifically, by 
demonstrating that Catholic interests in Connecticut effectively and 
repeatedly blocked efforts to repeal that state's anticontraceptive 
law and that a burgeoning right-to-life movement may well have 
undermined prochoice legislative reform efforts, Liberty and Sexu- 
ality implies that court action was instrumental to the cause of re- 
productive freedom.14 In striking this significant blow for judicial 
activism, Garrow masterfully rebuffs two strands of historically 
based criticism of Griswold and Roe. First, Garrow lays to rest the 
claim that Yale law professors cooked up Griswold because, as 
Judge Bork put it at his confirmation hearing, "they like this kind of 
litigation."'5 Instead, he demonstrates that before Griswold struck 
it down, Connecticut's anticontraception law had blocked creation 
of family planning centers for low-income women for more than 
two decades, thereby providing an equity-based justification for the 
lawsuit. Second, contrary to the recent wave of attacks by 
prochoice liberals - including Clinton Supreme Court appointee 
12. Garrow limits his description of John Noonan - then a University of California law 
professor and now a federal appeals court judge - to three words: "Roman Catholic law- 
yer." P. 330. Noonan, however, fares much better than Reagan Associate Deputy Attorney 
General Bruce Fein - whom Garrow refers to as "[a]n undistinguished but often-quoted 
one-time Justice Department official" (p. 267) - and Fordham law professor Robert M. 
Byrn, who Garrow describes as "a forty-year-old bachelor who still lived with his mother" (p. 
522). 
13. David J. Garrow, David Garrow on Roe v. Wade, RTS., Apr.-June 1994, at 2,4 (inter- 
view with Edith Tiger). 
14. This lesson is implicit in Liberty and Sexuality. Garrow's technique is to sweep his 
readers away in a tidal wave of information and, after they have recovered from this factual 
onslaught, to let them reach whatever conclusions they may. For many reviewers of Liberty 
and Sexuality, Garrow's refusal to explain what lessons should be drawn from his narrative is 
a frustrating shortcoming. See, e.g., Gerald Rosenberg, Political Processes and Institutions, 23 
CONTEMP. SOCY. 656 (1994); R. Alta Charo, The Civil Rights Struggle Over Human Repro- 
duction, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 181 (1994) (book review); Kristin Luker, The Hard Road to 
Roe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, ? 7 (Book Review) (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY), at 
7. For me, I rather liked being left to my own devices to make sense of the extraordinary 
mass of uniformly well-presented information that is Liberty and Sexuality. 
15. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
1, at 116 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork). 
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg - against Roe as being counterproductive to 
the prochoice movement, Garrow's history lesson makes clear that 
the prochoice movement was necessarily dependent upon judicial 
action. 
Garrow's history lesson is incomplete, however. While demon- 
strating that Roe was a necessary step to the creation of meaningful 
abortion rights, Liberty and Sexuality inaccurately infers that the 
story of reproductive freedom is one of judicial resistance to legisla- 
tures dominated by prolife interest groups. Garrow does not con- 
sider the ways in which judicial decisionmaking and elected 
government action affected each other. For example, although Lib- 
erty and Sexuality considers post-Roe developments up through the 
Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,16 it limits its sights to court-related action. 
Garrow does not give any meaningful treatment to legislation and 
regulation designed to alter the face of abortion rights. More signif- 
icantly, he does not consider the ramifications of such elected gov- 
ernment action on Court decisionmaking. Garrow simply cannot 
achieve his grander objective of helping "people to appreciate what 
Roe really represents"17 without considering the constitutional dia- 
logue that has taken place between the courts and elected govern- 
ment in the three decades since Griswold and the two decades since 
Roe. 
That Garrow's presentation is incomplete reveals Liberty and 
Sexuality's obsession with elevating the stature of Roe v. Wade to a 
victory for American freedom on the order of Brown v. Board of 
Education. At one level, Garrow's comparison fails because Brown 
is generally understood to be "the greatest moral triumph constitu- 
tional law ha[s] ever produced,"18 whereas honorable people can 
disagree about the moral rightness of a decision that places repro- 
ductive autonomy ahead of potential human life. Yet, even if the 
Roe-Brown analogy is appropriate - as it almost certainly is for a 
good many of Garrow's readers - Brown itself points to the neces- 
sity of getting beyond Supreme Court decisions and into elected 
government action in explicating the shaping of constitutional val- 
ues. Just as the story of Brown must include southern resistance, 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,19 and the busing controversy, the story of 
Roe v. Wade encompasses abortion funding restrictions, the "gag 
rule," and several other legislative and executive initiatives. 
16. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
17. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, supra note 11. 
18. BORK, supra note 5, at 77. 
19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. 
?? 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
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This review will help put Roe in proper perspective by consider- 
ing the ways that elected government and judicial action influence 
each other. In particular, the story of abortion rights must consider 
how social and political forces contributed to the Court's modera- 
tion of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a decision that re- 
placed Roe's stringent trimester standard with a less demanding 
"undue burden" test.20 While this exercise may deflate Roe's 
achievements, it will also point to the pivotal role that Supreme 
Court decisions play in elected government deliberations. Specifi- 
cally, when considering the constitutionality of legislative and regu- 
latory initiatives, elected government has looked to Supreme Court 
decisions as the defining benchmark. Furthermore, rather than ap- 
proving legislation or regulations directly at odds with Roe, elected 
government has expressed its opposition through funding bans and 
other indirect techniques. Finally, and most significantly, Roe and 
its progeny shaped elected government attitudes toward abortion. 
The result of this interaction is that despite the Casey Court's re- 
turning much of the abortion issue to the states, state lawmakers 
apparently preferring the Roe-created status quo - no longer ap- 
pear interested in enacting antiabortion restrictions. 
Liberty and Sexuality recognizes neither the profound role 
played by political and social influences in Court decisionmaking 
nor the equally profound effect of Court decisionmaking in shaping 
the scope and sweep of elected government action. Garrow's book 
is nonetheless monumental - far and away the definitive guide to 
the Court's reasoning in and the political developments that pre- 
ceded Griswold and Roe. This review, building upon Garrow's les- 
sons regarding the Supreme Court's role in the abortion dispute, 
offers an alternative paradigm to the one Garrow suggests. Part I 
of this review summarizes Liberty and Sexuality's ample teachings 
about the leadership role that courts played in fueling the reproduc- 
tive autonomy movement. Without decisions like Griswold and 
Roe, as Liberty and Sexuality makes clear, it is uncertain whether 
and when the political process would have recognized an individ- 
ual's right to reproductive freedom. Part II of this review extends 
the teachings of Liberty and Sexuality by considering the ways 
elected government and the courts influence each other. 
I. THE ROAD TO ROE 
Liberty and Sexuality is at its best when demonstrating the ne- 
cessity of judicial action to make reproductive freedom meaningful, 
particularly by using the stories of those involved in this crusade. 
Contrary to what we are led to believe by the self-serving revision- 
20. 112 S. Ct. at 2819. 
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ist histories of conservatives who dislike judicially created rights 
and progressives who now see the legislatures as more rights- 
protective than the courts, the evisceration of Connecticut's an- 
ticontraception statute and the establishment of meaningful abor- 
tion rights required judicial intervention. 
A. Birth Control in Connecticut 
Garrow's presentation of the story of Griswold is truly a revela- 
tion, for the Bork view that Griswold was simply a test case put 
together by a group of elites at the Yale law school is widely shared. 
Indeed, during my first year of teaching, I was told a tale about how 
the wife of Yale University's president - who, along with her 
upper-crust friends, was active in Planned Parenthood - convinced 
New Haven's chief of police at a cocktail party to arrest her for 
violating the otherwise unenforced anticontraception statute.21 The 
truth of the matter is that the Connecticut law blocked the opera- 
tion of family planning clinics, preventing poor women from, 
among other things, being able to be fitted for diaphragms.22 Ro- 
man Catholic hospitals in several Connecticut cities, moreover, dis- 
missed from their staffs doctors who publicly opposed the 
anticontraception statute.23 While men were able to purchase con- 
doms at gas stations, drug stores, and the like (p. 128), and women 
of means were able to skirt the Connecticut law through state- 
condoned diaphragm fittings at the offices of noncomplying physi- 
cians (p. 136), the effect of the anticontraception statute was hardly 
imaginary. 
The real story of Griswold begins in 1939. In June of that year, 
the Catholic Clergy Association of Waterbury passed a resolution, 
"read from the pulpit of each and every Roman Catholic Church in 
Waterbury," condemning birth control as "contrary to the natural 
law and therefore immoral" and calling for the enforcement "to the 
full extent of the law" of an 1879 Connecticut criminal statute sanc- 
tioning individuals who use or assist in the use of contraceptives (p. 
5). Drafted by P.T. Barnum - "of circus fame" (p. 16) - and 
supported by Catholic church officials who argued that "[t]he Crea- 
tor gave the sex function for just one purpose" (p. 17), the Connect- 
icut law was generally ignored and seemed destined to become 
obsolete when the Waterbury clergy made their appeal. In re- 
sponse to the clergy's call to shut down the recently opened Water- 
bury Maternal Health Center, however, police raided the clinic and 
arrested its physician-directors. Following a state supreme court 
21. Garrow lists several versions of this story. See pp. 267-68. 
22. P. 171. Many of these women traveled to New York state for diaphragm fittings. P. 
139. 
23. See Dudziak, supra note 9, at 928-29. 
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decision upholding the statute,24 the Waterbury clinic and all other 
birth control clinics in Connecticut closed their doors (pp. 77-78). 
For the next twenty-five years, family planning advocates in 
Connecticut - led by Kit Hepburn, the actress's mother and an 
activist whose reform efforts date back to 1910 (pp. 9-10) - unsuc- 
cessfully lobbied the Connecticut legislature to repeal the 1879 stat- 
ute. Despite a pronounced "gap between the practices of Catholic 
lay people and the proclamations of church officials,"25 the 
Catholic-dominated Connecticut Senate repeatedly stymied legisla- 
tive reform in Connecticut. Testifying before the Connecticut legis- 
lature about "'moral principles which are the foundation of this 
law'" (p. 127) and using its pulpits to inform parishioners that 
"'support of any candidate advocating birth control measures is a 
violation of the natural law of God' " (p. 118), the Catholic Church 
was a special interest far more powerful than the combined force of 
family planning advocates and public opinion. 
With no meaningful prospect for legislative reform, birth control 
advocates turned their attention to the courts. In Tileston v. Ull- 
man26 and Poe v. Ullman,27 however, Connecticut state courts and 
the U.S. Supreme Court proved unsympathetic to these efforts. 
The Supreme Court's attitude - brilliantly and thoroughly can- 
vassed in Liberty and Sexuality - was akin to the view later ex- 
pressed by Judge Bork, namely, that the Connecticut statute was 
unenforced and therefore a nullity. It did not matter to the Court 
that the anticontraception statute was challenged by doctors unable 
to treat their patients as well as married couples who faced signifi- 
cant pregnancy-related threats to their physical health (pp. 144-46). 
For Chief Justice Earl Warren, the plaintiffs - seeking to force the 
Court to embrace the then-discredited doctrine of substantive due 
process - had made the Justices " 'guinea pigs for an abstract prin- 
ciple'" (p. 181). To prove this point, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
called Waterbury prosecutor Bill Fitzgerald to discuss his affidavit 
that any person who violates the 1879 statute "'must expect to be 
prosecuted and punished'" (p. 187). This remarkable conversation 
confirmed Frankfurter's intuition that there was little threat of 
prosecution under the Connecticut statute. 
Although the Supreme Court had declared the Connecticut law 
a practical nullity, Planned Parenthood - both fearing prosecu- 
tions and hoping to change the law through judicial or legislative 
reform - had yet to violate the 1879 statute. Consequently, with 
24. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940). 
25. P. 164. When Griswold was argued, seventy-eight percent of Catholics thought that 
birth control information should be widely available. P. 229. 
26. 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942). 
27. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
1439 May 1995] 
Michigan Law Review 
no birth control clinics in Connecticut, Poe forced Planned 
Parenthood to choose between open defiance of the law by provid- 
ing contraceptive services and legislative reform efforts, which had 
proven unsuccessful for close to fifty years. The former course was 
chosen. One day after Poe, Planned Parenthood openly declared its 
intention to violate the law by publicly offering contraceptive serv- 
ices, noting in a press statement that they "would 'of course wel- 
come prosecution by the state' so that the 'absurd and antiquated' 
1879 law could be removed from the books" (p. 196). Within one 
week of the clinic's opening, police arrested Estelle Griswold, presi- 
dent of Connecticut's Planned Parenthood Federation, and Lee 
Buxton, the former chair of the obstetrics and gynecology depart- 
ment at Yale's medical school, presenting the Court with a clearly 
justiciable challenge to the 1879 statute.28 
The Supreme Court found itself in a quandary with Griswold. 
Earl Warren's decision to assign the case to William O. Douglas 
whose cavalier approach to opinion writing revealed an "inatten- 
tion to legal detail and indifference to precedent"29 - did not help 
matters. His initial Griswold draft, as Garrow points out, "may 
have taken more than twenty minutes [to write], but not [by] much" 
(p. 245). Unwilling to utilize the substantive due process analysis 
that he and other New Dealers fought so hard to defeat, Douglas 
relied on the First Amendment's right of association, an approach 
that prompted Justice Hugo Black to state at conference that the 
"'right of husband and wife to assemble in bed is a new right of 
assembly to me'" (p. 245). Recognizing the failings of Douglas's 
initial approach, William Brennan and his law clerk Paul Posner de- 
vised an alternative strategy. "'Instead of expanding the First 
Amendment,' " Brennan wrote Douglas, why not say the Connecti- 
cut statute violates the right to privacy " 'created out of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Fifth, together with the Third'" (p. 247). 
From this letter emerged Douglas's recognition of a right to privacy 
"emanating" from the "penumbras" surrounding various provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.30 
28. Specifically, in response to pressure from James G. Morris, "a forty-two-year-old 
West Haven Roman Catholic father of five [who] was the night manager of Avis Rent-a-Car's 
Downtown Garage," (p. 202) New Haven police investigated a just-opened family planning 
clinic. There they found Estelle Griswold who "was quite overjoyed to see them" and 
promptly told police of action she had taken in "violation of the [1879] law." P. 203. 
29. SCHWARTZ, WARREN COURT, supra note 9, at 237 (quoting JAMES F. SIMON, IN- 
DEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 252-53 (1980)). 
30. This Brennan-inspired alternative also seemed silly, "attract[ing] the giggles" of the 
Justices' clerks. P. 249. Several Justices considered alternative approaches, none of which 
attracted significant support. Arthur Goldberg settled on a Ninth Amendment strategy and 
instructed his law clerk - now Supreme Court Justice - Stephen Breyer "to undertake the 
appropriate research and preliminary drafting." P. 250. Another approach - suggested by 
Warren law clerk and Roe critic John Hart Ely - was to invalidate the 1879 law on equal 
protection grounds by looking at "how the Connecticut statute prevented the operation of 
1440 [Vol. 93:1433 
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That Griswold might reinvigorate substantive due process deci- 
sionmaking, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, seems 
hardly surprising. When Griswold was decided, however, the Court 
was clearly uncomfortable with taking this step. Liberty and Sexu- 
ality makes this abundantly clear. Warren's discomfort with sub- 
stantive due process explains his decision not to assign Griswold to John Marshall Harlan (p. 243), who - with the help of his law clerk 
and later Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried31 - had earlier 
relied on substantive due process analysis in attacking the constitu- 
tionality of the Connecticut statute (p. 195). Moreover, while many 
of the Justices spoke of the marital right to privacy in their Gris- 
wold determinations, these Justices recognized that it would be 
quite a trick "to persuasively articulate how one or another ac- 
cepted constitutional doctrine applied to the Connecticut statute" 
(pp. 243-44; emphasis added). The Court never accomplished this 
trick. For better or worse, Griswold began the Court's descent 
down the slippery slope that ultimately led it to Roe's formal em- 
brace of substantive due process decisionmaking. 
B. From Griswold to Roe 
A New York University law student, Roy Lucas, discovered the 
Griswold-Roe nexus in the fall of 1966.32 That neither the repro- 
ductive rights community nor legal academics saw Griswold as the 
first step to court-ordered abortion rights now seems remarkable. 
At the time of Griswold, however, there was little reason to think 
that the Supreme Court was prepared to seize on substantive due 
process doctrine to alter fundamentally the laws of nearly every 
state. Garrow, while sympathetic to the Court's expansive use of 
privacy, makes clear that the Griswold-Roe connection was barely 
imaginable until fledgling law graduate Roy Lucas began convinc- 
ing federal courts to strike down antiabortion laws in the late 1960s. 
Before Griswold, the thought of a constitutional right to abor- 
tion seemed farfetched. Birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger, in 
explaining her opposition to Connecticut's anticontraception law, 
" 'emphasized strongly that the advocates of birth control are not in 
favor of abortion, but desire only to prevent the beginning of life' " 
(p. 17). The original legal challenge to the Connecticut law, more- 
over, labeled "contraception the 'antithesis' of abortion ... [which] 
birth control clinics for the poor, but not the provision of similar services to better-off pa- 
tients of private physicians." P. 237. While prochoice critics of Roe now embrace this tactic, 
none of the Griswold-era Justices pursued this approach. P. 250. 
31. Fried informed Harlan before oral arguments in the Poe case that "'individual mar- 
ried couples have a right to engage in marital relations in the privacy of their own con- 
sciences.'" P. 174. 
32. Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration 
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730 (1968). 
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'the State has the right to control.' "33. With few exceptions pre- 
Griswold abortion rights advocates opposed efforts to repeal an- 
tiabortion measures in favor of less-sweeping reforms. In 1959, for 
example, Alan Guttmacher spoke of " 'vigorously oppos[ing]' "any 
proposal for "'unrestricted legal abortion' " (p. 278). 
Griswold and its immediate aftermath likewise reveal a sharp 
divide between the contraception and abortion issues. When the 
Court heard Griswold, Planned Parenthood attorney and Yale law 
professor Thomas Emerson noted at oral arguments that the invali- 
dation of the anticontraception law would not create a right to 
abortion. Emerson claimed that "'[t]he conduct that is being pro- 
hibited in the abortion cases'" does not "'occur in the privacy of 
the home" and that " '[abortion] involves taking what has begun to 
be a life.'"34 In the Court's private deliberations of Griswold, 
moreover, Earl Warren went out of his way to distinguish the Con- 
necticut statute from antiabortion measures, "implying that he 
thought such laws were valid."35 More striking than the Court's 
consideration of Griswold, as Liberty and Sexuality reveals, is the 
first wave of reactions to the case. Roy Lucas's initial choice for 
faculty sponsor, Norman Dorsen - who later served as president 
of the American Civil Liberties Union - was not enthusiastic 
about the project. As Lucas later recalled, " 'People thought it was 
a weird idea. My professors kind of laughed at me' " (p. 337). The 
civil liberties community too thought that Griswold did not provide 
an adequate basis to challenge abortion laws. In February 1966, the 
ACLU concluded that " 'restrictive abortion laws . .. while unduly 
restrictive, are not so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional' " and 
that " 'society could decide ... to place such value on the life of the 
unborn child as to render abortion possible only in a narrow range 
of circumstances'" (p. 313). 
How then did an idea first concocted in the spring of 1967 when 
Roy Lucas finished his law school paper make its way to the 
Supreme Court four years later when certiorari was granted in Roe? 
Liberty and Sexuality does a superb job of chronicling the meteoric 
rise of court-ordered abortion rights, beginning with a July 1968 
model brief prepared by Lucas and culminating with the Court's 
decision in Roe. 
For starters, the principal impetus for court-ordered reform 
came from the courts themselves. In 1968, retired Supreme Court 
Justice Tom C. Clark advanced a Griswold-based right to abortion, 
33. P. 70; see also p. 274. 
34. P. 240. Emerson, however, did suggest in a 1965 Michigan Law Review symposium 
on Griswold that the Court might be willing to recognize abortion rights. Thomas I. Emer- 
son, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965). 
35. SCHWARTZ, WARREN COURT, supra note 9, at 239. 
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at least "until the time that life is present."36 Yet in early 1969 the 
principal focus of the reform movement was legislative liberaliza- 
tion in New York and other states (p. 367). Although Roy Lucas 
seemed determined to launch a series of coordinated test case chal- 
lenges (p. 381), judicial reform did not take hold until the fall of 
1969, when courts in California and Washington, D.C. rejected state 
efforts to prosecute doctors for violating antiabortion restrictions. 
In one case, People v. Belous,37 the California Supreme Court de- 
clared that "[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose 
whether to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and this 
court's repeated acknowledgement of a 'right to privacy.' "38 In 
United States v. Vuitch,39 federal district court judge Gerhard Gesell 
spoke of "increasing indication" in Supreme Court decisions that 
the "right of privacy ... may well include the right to remove an 
unwanted child at least in early stages of pregnancy."40 
With Belous and Vuitch, the prochoice community began to 
grasp the obvious, namely, that courts were far more likely than 
legislators to liberalize abortion rights. The most visible of these 
challenges, of course, is Roe itself. Garrow makes clear that the 
Roe litigation, unlike the NAACP's deliberative strategy in 
Brown,41 was decidedly haphazard - much closer to spontaneous 
combustion than to the carefully drawn plans of some national in- 
terest group. 
The chain reaction that ultimately produced Roe v. Wade began 
in March 1969, when women members of the University of Texas's 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) turned to gender issues 
after witnessing "the disagreeably sexist behavior of SDS's male na- 
tional leaders" at an SDS National Council meeting (p. 389). One 
manifestation of this shift was the distribution of information on 
how to obtain an abortion in Mexico. Perceiving that more needed 
to be done, these women asked Sarah Weddington - a 1967 Texas 
law graduate - whether she would consider launching a constitu- 
tional challenge to Texas's antiabortion law (p. 395). Weddington 
agreed, enlisted the help of her law school classmate Linda Coffee, 
and waited for a plaintiff to materialize. Thanks to serendipity, a 
pregnant woman who wanted an abortion, Norma McCorvey, 
36. P. 372 (quoting Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional 
Appraisal, 2 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1969)). 
37. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969). 
38. Belous, 458 P.2d at 199 (quoted at p. 377). 
39. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
40. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1035, quoted at p. 382. 
41. On the NAACP's litigation strategy, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE 
COURTS (1994) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Margaret Russell - Ed.); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987). 
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quickly emerged and granted her permission to launch a Jane Roe 
challenge to the Texas law.42 
While the rest may be history, Liberty and Sexuality does a phe- 
nomenal job of exposing how many rocks there were on the road to 
Roe. Far from a pitched battle between high-powered veteran law- 
yers, the contest between Weddington and Coffee, and the State of 
Texas reveals the grass-roots nature of the Roe challenge. Wed- 
dington and Coffee did their own typing in filing their original com- 
plaint and brief (pp. 438-39). In preparing their Supreme Court 
filings, Weddington in particular confronted a lack of resources, ne- 
cessitating her lawyer-husband's last minute participation in the 
brief drafting, and the help of an overly aggressive Roy Lucas, who 
- as head of the poorly run Madison Institute - sought to dis- 
place her as lead counsel in the case.43 For the State of Texas, Roe 
inspired a less-than-vigorous defense. The bulk of the Texas brief 
was lifted directly from a prolife amicus filing by two hundred and 
twenty-two physicians - a brief that had been shared with the state 
for this very purpose.44 
Internal Supreme Court deliberations likewise reveal that when 
Roe was first argued, its landmark status was anything but inevita- 
ble. The original Blackmun draft, as revealed by Bernard Schwartz 
in 1988, struck down the Texas statute on vagueness grounds and 
expressly rejected the argument that "'a pregnant woman has an 
unlimited right to do with her body as she pleases.' "45 How this 
weak-kneed approach to abortion rights evolved into Roe's express 
embrace of substantive due process and its unyielding trimester test 
is one of the highlights of Liberty and Sexuality. For starters, 
42. Norma McCorvey - unlike the challengers to the Connecticut anticontraception 
statute - was indigent, uneducated, and not particularly interested in reshaping the direction 
of constitutional jurisprudence. P. 404. In convincing McCorvey, Coffee "stressed that being 
a plaintiff would not take much time, would not entail any costs, and almost certainly would 
not require any courtroom testimony or public identification." Id. True to Coffee's word, 
McCorvey was out of the loop throughout the Roe litigation. 
43. Pp. 461-62. Lucas's aggressive tactics were not appreciated. Sarah Weddington even- 
tually cut off communication with Lucas. P. 564. Prochoice lawyers also shut Lucas out of 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Roe's companion case. P. 463. In the end, while Lucas 
played an instrumental role in framing the prochoice litigation strategy, his self-righteous and 
intrusive posturing alienated him from much of the reproductive autonomy community. See 
pp. 463-64, 469-70, 493, 505. 
44. Pp. 510-11. Texas did not help its position at oral argument. Jay Floyd, who argued 
the case on behalf of Texas, began his argument with an off-color remark. Referring to Sarah 
Weddington and Linda Coffee, Floyd commented: "It's an old joke, but when a man argues 
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word." Oral Argument 
Transcript, 410 U.S. 113 (1993) (No. 70-18), reprinted in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU- 
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796 (Philip 
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). Floyd further weakened his case by responding to 
a question about Texas's choice to specify that life begins at conception by waxing philosoph- 
ically that "there are unanswerable questions in this field" and "[w]hen does the soul come 
into the unborn - if a person believes in a soul - I don't know." 75 Id. at 804. 
45. SCHWARTZ, BURGER COURT, supra note 9, at 90. 
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Warren Burger's decision to assign Roe, and its companion Georgia 
case, Doe v. Bolton46, to Harry Blackmun - according to William 
Douglas at least - reeks of the Chief Justice's manipulation of his 
case assignment authority. Although Blackmun was willing to 
strike down the Texas statute, Douglas's conference notes suggest 
that both Burger and Blackmun approved of Georgia's draconian 
restrictions on abortion rights (p. 533). Matters were further com- 
plicated when Blackmun signed onto a Burger-led effort to have 
Roe and Doe reargued so that newly confirmed Nixon appointees 
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist could participate in the deci- 
sion. According to Blackmun, "I believe, on an issue so sensitive 
and so emotional as this one, the country deserves the conclusion of 
a nine-man, not a seven-man court" (p. 552; emphasis added). 
Contrary to Burger's apparent intent, reargument, thanks to 
Lewis Powell's firming up the prochoice coalition, moved the Roe 
draft towards an absolutist prochoice posture.47 Not only did Pow- 
ell support overturning the Texas and Georgia statutes, but "he 
thought Roe 'should [be] the lead case' and that he would decide it 
not on vagueness grounds but on the more basic issue" (p. 575). 
Combusting with a strengthened majority, Brennan and Marshall 
- in a critical letter written by Marshall's law clerk Mark Tushnet 
- successfully lobbied Blackmun for the establishment of a trimes- 
ter standard guaranteeing women an unqualified right to abortion 
during the first three months of pregnancy (pp. 583-85). Although 
Potter Stewart objected to this "inflexibly legislative" approach, 
Blackmun concluded that such judicial policymaking, while "arbi- 
trary," was "not to be avoided."48 
C. Judicial v. Legislative Reform 
The Court designed Roe v. Wade to put an end to the abortion 
dispute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test gov- 
erning state authority over the abortion decision both to make clear 
what the Court intended and to limit future governmental efforts to 
sidestep the Court's decision. Indeed, Blackmun implored his col- 
leagues to decide Roe " 'no later than the week of January 15 to tie 
in with the convening of most state legislatures' " (p. 585) and pro- 
posed issuing a press statement to accompany the decision - some- 
thing that had never been done and ultimately was not done here 
- to keep the press from " 'going all the way off the deep end' " in 
reporting news of the decision (p. 587). 
46. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
47. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 332-52 (1994) (reviewed in this 
issue - Ed.). 
48. Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, D2. 
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Blackmun's efforts here reveal that politics played a large role 
in both the content and packaging of Roe. When he announced the 
decision, however, Blackmun started his opinion by observing that 
the judicial task was "to resolve the issue by constitutional measure- 
ment, free of emotion and of predilection."49 Portraying the Court 
as being above the political fray, the supreme pursuer of constitu- 
tional truth in our three-branch system, Blackmun apparently 
sought to strengthen the Court's legitimacy and to ensure that 
states widely followed Roe.50 Twenty years later, in announcing his 
retirement, Blackmun declared victory. With prochoice president 
Bill Clinton at his side and Roe's reaffirmation recently secured, 
Blackmun described Roe as "a step that had to be taken as we go 
down the road to the full emancipation of women."51 
Whether Blackmun's claims about Roe's achievements and the 
legacy Blackmun left us through Roe are more ethereal than real is 
the question du jour. Over the past several years, prochoice liberals 
have increasingly savaged Roe. Political scientist Gerald Rosen- 
berg, for example, contends that Roe "was far less responsible for 
the changes that occurred than most people think"52 and that the 
growth of right-to-life forces in the wake of the decision suggests 
"that one result of litigation to produce significant social reform is 
to strengthen the opponents of such change."53 More strikingly, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in December 1992, lambasted Roe for "pro- 
long[ing] divisiveness and deferr[ing] stable settlement of the [abor- 
tion] issue" by short-circuiting early 1970s legislative reform 
efforts.54 On another occasion, Ginsburg attacked Roe as "[h]eavy- 
handed judicial intervention" and said that it "ventured too far in 
the change that it ordered."55 
What gives? With tens of thousands of legislative proposals, 
countless executive initiatives, wicked Supreme Court confirmation 
battles, and more acrimony than any social policy issue since slav- 
ery, it seems a little late in the day to wonder whether or not Roe 
mattered. Nevertheless, a slew of highly regarded political scien- 
tists and constitutional lawyers - most of whom are avidly 
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
50. Blackmun advanced similar claims in subsequent abortion decisions. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part concurring in part, and dissenting in part); Thorburg v. American College of Obst. & 
Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986). 
51. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: How a Ruling on Abortion Took on a Life of Its 
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, ? 4, at 3. 
52. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 201 (1991). 
53. Id. at 342. 
54. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 
(1992). 
55. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe 
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381, 385 (1985). 
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prochoice - now depict Roe as counterproductive, a "hollow 
hope."56 For this new wave of Court critics, only social movements 
and elected branch action accomplish meaningful reform. 
Roe's progressive critics emphasize that in the decade preceding 
the decision, the abortion pendulum had begun to swing.57 In 1962, 
the Model Penal Code was amended to authorize abortions when 
the health of the mother was endangered, when the infant might be 
born with incapacitating physical or mental deformities, or when 
the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest. In 1967, the American 
Medical Association endorsed the Model Penal Code's limited ap- 
proval of abortion. In 1971, the National Conference of Commis- 
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform Abortion Act 
that would have placed no limitations on abortion during the first 
twenty weeks of pregnancy. By the time of Roe, seventeen states 
had liberalized their abortion laws, principally adopting the limited 
reforms of the Model Penal Code. Pointing to these developments, 
Ginsburg and others maintain that the Court could have left it to 
state legislatures to reform their abortion laws.58 
Liberty and Sexuality meets these progressive critics of Roe 
head on by demonstrating that despite changes in state law, the 
medical profession, and public opinion, the reformers were fighting 
an uphill battle. Many states rejected the Model Penal Code re- 
form, and some states that enacted reform legislation imposed so 
many restrictions that the number of legal abortions actually de- 
creased.59 When the Court decided Roe, strict antiabortion laws re- 
mained on the books in nearly every state. Contrary to Ginsburg's 
claims, the abortion reform movement barely put a dent in state 
laws criminalizing abortion. "[C]alculating that therapeutic excep- 
tions bills were the most they could possibly attain," most prochoice 
activists did not even seek repeal of criminal abortion statutes (pp. 
359, 374). 
The legislative battles leading up to Roe are telling for other 
reasons. In the early stages of this reform movement, there was no 
right-to-life movement. By the time of Roe, a vigorous right-to-life 
movement was prepared to do battle with prochoice reformers. Of 
great significance, in 1972, right-to-life activists helped defeat Mich- 
igan and North Dakota referenda that would have repealed those 
states' criminal abortion laws (pp. 576-77). In the months before 
the Roe decision, moreover, prolife interests scored key legislative 
56. See ROSENBERG, supra note 52. 
57. See Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
233-34 (1992). 
58. See supra notes 52-55; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 751, 766-67 (1991). 
59. EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 23 (rev. ed. 1987). 
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victories in Pennsylvania, where legislation allowing abortions only 
when the mother's life was threatened was approved by a 157-to-34 
vote, and in Massachusetts, which approved by 178-to-46 a bill that 
specified conception as the beginning of human life (p. 547). In New York, prolife forces, headed by the Roman Catholic Church, 
were gaining momentum in an effort to repeal that state's permis- 
sive abortion legislation (p. 368). 
"From the immediate vantage point of 1973," Garrow con- 
cludes, no one in the prochoice community - with memories of the 
right-to-life mobilization effort "so freshly in mind" - expressed 
any regret that the Supreme Court "had ruled that a woman's 
choice with regard to abortion was a constitutionally protected right 
rather than a criminally punishable preference that could be left to 
the annual vagaries of state legislative votes or statewide popular 
referenda" (pp. 616-17). While there is no way of telling precisely 
what the political process would have yielded had the Court left the 
abortion decision with the states,60 Garrow persuasively demon- 
strates that the prospects of sweeping legislative reform were dim. 
Most states did not reform their laws, and for the most part, those 
that did made only minor alterations. Furthermore, a rapidly grow- 
ing and increasingly powerful right-to-life movement raised doubts 
about future reform efforts. 
Liberty and Sexuality's defense of judicial intervention - at 
least for supporters of reproductive rights - is convincing. The 
stories of Roe and Griswold reveal that legislative majorities were 
unwilling to expand reproductive rights. Whether one describes 
this failure as the triumph of special interests or as the preservation 
of moral norms, progressive defenders of the political marketplace 
are "far off target."61 
II. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PARADOX 
Garrow's proof that judicial intervention and "liberty and sexu- 
ality" go hand in hand tells only part of the story of what Roe really 
represents. Courts cannot go it alone in ordering massive social 
change. Elected government action at the state and federal level 
plays an integral role in the shaping of constitutional values. Lib- 
erty and Sexuality, for all its virtues, is blinded by its obsession with 
Court action. The book brushes aside state and federal responses 
60. On this question, Jeffrey Rosen concludes that "[t]he political evidence that Garrow 
collects fails to undermine Ginsburg's basic insight." Jeffrey Rosen, Penumbras Formed by 
Emanations, ATLATrIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1994, at 121, 122 (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUAL- 
rrY). Kathleen Sullivan, in contrast, concludes that "Garrow convincingly depicts the legisla- 
tive success of the [right-to-life movement]." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Law's Labors, NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 23, 1994, at 42, 44 (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY). 
61. David Garrow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court Nominee 
Doesn't Know About Roe, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C3. 
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to Roe - unless they concern attempts to shape Court doctrine 
through judicial appointments or Supreme Court advocacy. In- 
deed, Garrow's comprehensive discussions of the politics surround- 
ing Connecticut's contraception ban and the limits of pre-Roe 
legislative reform principally function as a foil to demonstrate the 
necessity of judicial intervention. 
While detailing the stories of the Roe and Griswold litigation is 
a monumental achievement, Garrow's presentation is nonetheless 
incomplete and, as a result, slightly misleading. This Part supple- 
ments Garrow's history lesson by considering post-Roe politics. 
Specifically, this Part calls attention to the ways courts and elected 
government shape constitutional values and each other. 
A. Elected Government Attitudes Toward the Judiciary 
Prochoice advocates' antipathy for elected government is easy 
to understand. Before Roe, nearly every state outlawed or placed 
significant restrictions on abortion access. Without Roe, moreover, 
there is little reason to think - as Garrow ably demonstrates 
that state reform efforts would have amounted to much. Finally, 
the bulk of post-Roe elected government activity appears downright 
hostile, not just to Roe but to judicial authority as well. 
Elected government resistance to abortion rights, however, does 
not mean that the dialogue between the courts and governmental 
actors is fundamentally adversarial - with the Court persistently 
beating down elected government's attacks. Over the past two de- 
cades, the courts have helped shape legislative norms. Of equal sig- 
nificance, elected government reprisals - contrary to most writings 
on this topic62 - reveal a profound respect for judicial authority 
among elected government officials. In these ways, the Court's in- 
fluence is even more profound than Liberty and Sexuality suggests. 
To be sure, most elected government action has sought to limit 
abortion rights. At the same time, no federal and virtually no state 
action has directly challenged Supreme Court decisionmaking au- 
thority. The campaign to have the Supreme Court overrule Roe, 
for example, hardly calls judicial authority into question. The ap- 
pointment of judges who disapprove of Roe as well as the filing of 
briefs calling for Roe's overruling, instead, recognize that the fate of 
Roe lies with the judiciary. 
More telling than these Court-centered efforts, legislative and 
regulatory initiatives reveal a willingness to work within parameters 
set by the Supreme Court. At the federal level, a Republican- 
controlled Senate rejected early 1980s proposals that sought to nul- 
62. See, e.g., BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1993); RUBIN, supra note 59; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF 
ABSOLUTES (1990). 
1449 May 1995] 
Michigan Law Review 
lify Roe - human life legislation, court-stripping, and constitu- 
tional amendment. When the federal government did act, it never 
directly called into question the correctness of Roe. Restrictions on 
abortion funding, family planning services, and fetal tissue research 
do not contradict Roe and its progeny. While these measures ex- 
press a preference for childbirth and make access to abortion serv- 
ices more difficult, none of these antiabortion efforts challenges the 
constitutionality of the abortion right. 
Drawing a line, as the federal government has done, between 
judicial authority, which it does not challenge, and abortion access 
- which, at least prior to the election of Bill Clinton, it did not 
support - is much more than the triumph of form over substance. 
That Congress and the White House have channeled their opposi- 
tion to a judicial pronouncement in ways that do not openly contra- 
dict Court decisionmaking is testament to the elected branches' 
respect for the judiciary as a coequal branch of government. In- 
deed, if anything, Congress and the White House have been ex- 
traordinarily solicitous of the Court's abortion-related action. 
When the elected branches engage in constitutional interpreta- 
tion, the undisputable benchmark of their efforts is Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. Not only are congressional reports and executive 
branch testimony replete with citations to the U.S. Reports, but 
neither executive branch officials nor legislators defend constitu- 
tional positions at odds with the Supreme Court. When Bush ad- 
ministration officials testified against Congress's efforts to use its 
commerce power to codify Roe, for example, they never forth- 
rightly embraced a theory of federalism at odds with Supreme 
Court pronouncements; instead, they couched their federalism ar- 
gument in public policy terms.63 Likewise, when the Senate Judici- 
ary Committee considered human life legislation, only 
subcommittee chair John East spoke of Congress's authority to in- 
terpret independently the Constitution, but his subcommittee re- 
port nonetheless emphasized Court decisionmaking.64 Admittedly, 
Court rulings are sufficiently open-ended that they present plenty 
of fodder for prochoice and prolife forces. In addition, the invoca- 
tion of Court decisions, rather than reflecting actual respect for the 
Court, may be little more than a smoke screen designed to gain 
partisan political advantage. The fact remains, however, that both 
63. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1991: Hearing of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1991) (statement of John Harrison, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter Harri- 
son Testimony]. 
64. See SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI- 
ARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE HUMAN LIFE BILL S. 158: REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDI- 
TIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 20-30 (Comm. Print 
1981). 
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sides of any given issue perceive that their constitutional arguments 
will be taken seriously only if built around Court doctrine. 
State responses to Roe, for the most part, follow a similar pat- 
tern. Although forty-eight states passed abortion legislation in the 
years following Roe, only a handful of states have played a leader- 
ship role in enacting stringent abortion laws. Most states wait to 
see if the courts will approve these "challenger" state initiatives.65 
Furthermore, most challenger state action is not clearly at odds 
with Court decisions but tests the limits of these decisions. For ex- 
ample, Roe did not explicitly address parental or spousal consent, 
public funding, hospital-only abortions, and waiting periods, among 
other things. State action on those subjects engages the judiciary in 
a dialogue on the sweep of abortion rights; it does not necessarily 
challenge Court authority.66 
The possibility that elected government output may not mea- 
sure elected government preferences also suggests that one should 
not read too much into elected government resistance to Roe. 
Many elected officials were quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely, 
for example, speaks of "[t]he sighs of relief as this particular alba- 
tross was cut from the legislative and executive necks."67 That 
states enacted an avalanche of abortion restrictions may only mean 
that legislators saw no downside in responding to prolife interest 
groups, for prochoice concerns were content to leave it to the courts 
to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and state efforts to 
limit abortion rights paid homage to a judiciary that would tow the 
line and provide whatever constitutional protections were 
appropriate. 
Roe's transformation of the political marketplace, in other 
words, was rooted in the belief that the Supreme Court would vig- 
orously defend abortion rights. By legalizing abortion, Roe elimi- 
nated the demand for prochoice legislation while leaving the 
demand for prolife legislation unaffected, or perhaps even causing 
it to grow. At the same time, Roe also increased the supply of 
prolife legislation. Before the decision, the benefit the prochoice 
65. See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, PUBILUs, Sum- 
mer 1990, at 27, 32-34. 
66. There is an important caveat here; state efforts to limit the sweep of abortion rights 
present - and are intended to present - the Court with an opportunity to rethink its posi- 
tion on abortion. As such, these efforts are clearly antagonistic to Roe. Nevertheless, virtu- 
ally all state antiabortion efforts - by speaking to matters not explicitly addressed by the 
Court - do not question the Court's authority to issue opinions or render judgments that 
"have general applicability and deserve the greatest respect from all Americans." Edwin 
Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1986, at A21, reprinted 
in 61 TUL. L. REV. 1003 app. at 1004 (1987). See generally Symposium, Perspectives on the 
Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL L. REV. 977 (1987). 
67. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 947 (1973). 
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movement obtained from a legislative victory was offset by the loss 
the prolife movement sustained, and vice versa. But Roe elimi- 
nated many, if not most, negative externalities associated with 
prolife laws. By writing abortion rights into the Constitution, the 
Court assured prochoicers that they could not lose the benefits they 
had won. Specifically, because courts likely would invalidate an- 
tiabortion measures that ran afoul of Roe's trimester test, 
prochoicers had little reason to fight legislative efforts to limit abor- 
tion access. Consequently, legislators voting on prolife bills no 
longer had to worry that their prochoice constituents might com- 
plain. Instead, they could vote for the bills so that the prolife activ- 
ists would obtain a legislative benefit, while Roe ensured that 
prochoice citizens would not suffer any measurable loss. 
Despite the efforts of prolife groups to pass laws that might give 
the Supreme Court an opportunity to limit Roe, between 1973 and 
1989 the Court decided only a single major issue in their favor, 
when it permitted states to refuse to fund poor women's abortions 
through Medicaid.68 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services69 
changed all that. On the brink of overturning Roe, three Justices 
declared "the rigid Roe framework"70 unworkable and opened the 
door to antiabortion legislation. Unlike Court rulings approving re- 
strictions on federal funding of abortions, Webster signaled the 
Court's readiness to limit abortion access for all women. By threat- 
ening the rights of middle- and upper-class women, however, Web- 
ster revealed a general contentment among federal and state 
legislators with the Roe-created "status quo." Specifically, rather 
than prompting a new wave of abortion regulation, legislative inac- 
tion followed in Webster's wake. 
The post-Webster calm reveals that many legislators would have 
preferred that the Court retain control over abortion and not return 
the issue to elected government. Grace Duke, a Republican Ohio 
state legislator, spoke of "everyone hoping the courts would decide 
and it wouldn't go through the legislatures."71 William Black, a Re- 
publican Illinois state legislator, began to support abortion rights in 
the aftermath of Webster, "which he said had given new weight and 
effect to his votes on abortion."72 Even in Missouri, Webster came 
as a not-entirely-welcome surprise to state legislators. "[Ninety- 
five] percent who voted for this bill [upheld in Webster] believed it 
68. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
69. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
70. 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.). 
71. Joe Frost, Americans in the Center Focus on Abortion Fight, NEW ORLEANS TIMES 
PICAYUNE, Sept. 11, 1991, at A3. 
72. William E. Schmidt, Onetime Abortion Foes Aren't So Sure Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 1989, at A18. 
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didn't have a chance,"73 argued Missouri prochoice activist Mary 
Bryant. "They looked at that preamble [specifying that life begins 
at conception] and laughed. 'This is stupid. The court will never go 
for it.' "74 
Webster's transformation of the political marketplace, although 
contrary to the predictions of prochoice and prolife interest groups 
that an avalanche of antiabortion legislation would follow in the 
decision's wake,75 is not surprising. Knowing that prochoice forces 
were "going to take names and kick ankles,"76 Webster made right- 
to-life initiatives less likely to succeed. The Roe-created "status 
quo" became the governing norm, despite the fact that Roe had 
earlier invalidated forty-six state laws.77 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey78 tells a similar tale. When the 
Court agreed to hear Casey in January 1992, abortion rights sup- 
porters saw the "neck of Roe v. Wade squarely on the judicial chop- 
ping block" and spoke of "[t]he days of safe and legal abortion in 
America [as] numbered."79 What the Court did, however, was to 
embrace a middle-ground approach - reaffirming Roe but re- 
jecting its stringent trimester standard in favor of a less-demanding 
undue burden standard. As was true with Webster, the Court's rec- 
ognition of broad state regulatory authority reinforced the post-Roe 
status quo. Most state Attorneys General, for example, have re- 
sisted enforcing existing state laws with Pennsylvania-type restric- 
tions.80 Instead, Attorneys General returned the issue to the state 
legislatures, claiming that lawmakers need to reaffirm their support 
73. Cynthia Gorney, Taking Aim at Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1989 (Magazine), 
at 18. 
74. Id. 
75. Representative Chris Smith (R-N.J.), chair of the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus, 
heralded Webster as "truly a significant victory for unborn children ... [that] is likely to lead 
to the enactment of state laws." Press Conference of the National Right to Life Committee, 
Federal News Service, July 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. Kate 
Michelman, Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), 
went a step further, observing, "We are now careening down the slippery slope towards gov- 
ernmental control of our most fundamental right. Women's lives hang by a thread, and the 
Justices this morning handed the state politicians a pair of scissors." Press Conference on the 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services Decision, Kate Michelman, Executive Director, Na- 
tional Abortion Rights Action League, Federal News Service, July 3, 1989, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. 
76. 135 CONG. REC. 18,170 (1989) (statement of Rep. Les AuCoin). 
77. Webster also prompted a spate of prochoice legislative initiatives at both the state and 
federal level. Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, and Washington all responded to the decision 
by passing protective legislation. At the federal level, Congress sought to loosen abortion 
funding restrictions - only to be thwarted by a Bush veto - and took up freedom of choice 
legislation to codify Roe v. Wade. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 57, at 232-44. 
78. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
79. Linda P. Campbell, Court To Hear Key Abortion Case, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1992, ? 1, 
at 1, 10. 
80. Mimi Hall, The Abortion Ruling: Day Two, USA TODAY, July 1, 1992, at 3A. 
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for abortion restrictions by writing a new law. State legislators, 
however, seem reluctant to enact antiabortion measures. Although 
Casey has hardly slowed down the pace of abortion-related propos- 
als - roughly three hundred measures were introduced in each of 
the two years following the decision81 - state responses to Casey 
reenforce the post-Webster trend of diminishing state intervention 
in abortion. Most striking, according to Alan Guttmacher Institute 
studies, "antiabortion legislators [have] heeded ... [Casey] and cur- 
tailed their attempts to make abortion illegal."82 In 1994, for exam- 
ple, no state introduced legislation to outlaw abortion.83 
Furthermore, in the two years following Casey, a third of legislative 
initiatives would have guaranteed the right to abortion.84 Finally, 
of the handful of abortion regulation measures adopted since 
Casey, most involve restrictions approved by the Court: waiting pe- 
riods, informed consent, and parental notification.85 
Casey's impact on federal abortion politics is also telling. Prior 
to the decision - when there was reason to think that the Court 
was set to overrule Roe v. Wade - Congress seemed poised to cod- 
ify abortion rights through freedom of choice legislation. Casey's 
qualified reaffirmation of Roe killed that effort, despite the fact that 
freedom of choice legislation was far more protective of abortion 
rights than the Court's newly minted "undue burden" standard.86 
For many prochoice lawmakers, there no longer was adequate rea- 
son for Congress to bear the decisional costs of taking a hard-line 
position on abortion rights. After all, Roe - though crippled - 
was clearly alive. Along the same lines, Congress saw no reason to 
challenge directly the Court's decisionmaking authority - some- 
thing it is typically reluctant to do in constitutional disputes - over 
something as amorphous as the appropriate standard of review in 
abortion cases. 
Elected government perceptions about the judicial role and the 
respect owed Supreme Court decisions figures prominently in the 
story of abortion politics. To begin with, rather than independently 
interpret the Constitution, elected officials frame their constitu- 
tional arguments around Supreme Court decisions. Far more signif- 
81. Alan Guttmacher Inst., Legislative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD. HEALTH 
MONITOR, May 1994, at i [hereinafter 1994 HEALTH MONITOR; Alan Guttmacher Inst., Legis- 
lative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD. HEALTH MONITOR, Dec. 1993, at i [hereinafter 
1993 HEALTH MONITOR]. 
82. 1993 HEALTH MONITOR, supra note 81, at i. 
83. 1994 HEALTH MONITOR, supra note 81, at ii. 
84. See 1994 HEALTH MONITOR, supra note 81; 1993 HEALTH MONITOR, supra note 81. 
85. See id. State refusal to act on Casey refutes the suggestion that Roe led to increased 
public opposition to nontherapeutic abortions. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, 
Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989). 
86. See Harrison Testimony, supra note 63. 
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icantly, elected government has chosen certain types of limited 
responses and rejected more confrontational approaches. That is 
quite significant, as is the fact that federal and state officials, while 
supporting measures at odds with abortion rights, may well have 
preferred that the Court maintain control over this issue. On this 
point, the striking absence of elected government action following 
the Court's recognition of substantial state regulatory power in 
Webster and Casey suggests a seeming contentment with Court- 
created abortion rights. Liberty and Sexuality, while heralding the 
judicial intervention in Griswold and Roe, does not fully recognize 
the impact of Court decisionmaking. The real story of Roe v. Wade, 
contrary to Garrow's inference but supportive of his hypothesis, 
reveals a surprising sensitivity of elected government to the 
judiciary. 
B. Social and Political Influences on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking 
Just as the courts shape elected government, elected govern- 
ment also shapes the courts. Liberty and Sexuality, by treating 
Court decisionmaking as the sine qua non of the abortion dispute, 
never considers the pivotal role that social and political influences 
play in Court decisionmaking. 
Throughout the post-Roe period, the Court validated elected 
government efforts to limit abortion rights. At the federal level, the 
Court approved several legislative and regulatory initiatives and 
struck down none. By emphasizing Congress's power of the purse 
and the deference owed to executive branch statutory interpreta- 
tions, the Supreme Court upheld abortion funding restrictions in 
Harris v. McRae;87 federally supported adoption counseling by reli- 
gious organizations in Bowen v. Kendrick;88 and regulations forbid- 
ding family planning centers from discussing abortion in Rust v. 
Sullivan.89 These decisions make clear that the elected branches 
play a vital role in the abortion dispute. 
1992's Planned Parenthood v. Casey90 is a culmination of these 
interchanges between the Court and elected government. After 
five abortion-dominated Supreme Court confirmation hearings and 
hundreds of thousands of abortion protesters marching each year at 
its steps, the Court formally reconsidered and moderated Roe. By 
simultaneously reaffirming abortion rights and gutting Roe's strin- 
gent trimester test, Casey sought to find a middle ground between 
two irreconcilable poles. 
87. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
88. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
89. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
90. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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Casey is a remarkable decision. At one level, the Court seems 
beside itself in self-doubt. Acknowledging that it can neither ap- 
propriate funds nor command the military to enforce its orders, the 
Court recognizes that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's accept- 
ance of the Judiciary."91 In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler 
and Gregory Mitchell observe, the Court seems to believe "that 
public acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitu- 
tion - that is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legiti- 
macy - enhances public acceptance of controversial Court 
decisions."92 This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary 
seems proof positive that the outcome in Casey cannot be divorced 
from the case's explosive social and political setting.93 
Casey, however, goes to great lengths to declare that "social and 
political pressures,"94 far from being relevant, must be resisted. 
Otherwise, anarchy will rule the day, for our nation will have for- 
saken its commitment "to the rule of law."95 For this reason, Casey 
hinges its reaffirmation of Roe on stare decisis grounds. In other 
words, whether or not the Court correctly decided Roe is beside the 
point; the Court's institutional legitimacy and, with it, the rule of 
law will be shattered if the Court "overrule[s] under fire."96 Be- 
yond this rule of law claim, Casey invokes judicial supremacy to 
defend its authority to settle the abortion dispute. Calling on the 
"contending sides of a national controversy to end their national 
division,"97 Casey implores the public to rise to the occasion by sub- 
mitting to the Court. 
All of this brings us to the $64,000 question: How independent 
is the Court? Casey's middle-ground approach, as well as its em- 
phasis on legitimacy and public acceptance, at face value, supports 
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2814. 
92. Tom R. Tler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary 
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 
715 (1994). 
93. Casey's middle-ground approach to both abortion rights and broad state regulatory 
authority, without question, matched public opinion. Fifty-seven percent of voters supported 
the Pennsylvania law. Wall Street Journal/NBC Poll, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1992, at Al. By a 
fifty-nine to twenty-one percent margin, however, voters also said that they were more likely 
to support candidates who support abortion rights in the 1992 elections. Wall Street Journal/ 
NBC Poll, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1992, at Al. More specifically, "many Americans ... sup- 
port such restrictions on access to abortion services as requiring women younger than 18 
years to get a parent's permission (70% to 73% approve), a 24-hour waiting period (69% to 
81%), and requiring married women to inform their husbands before receiving an abortion 
(62% to 69%)." Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public and the Controversy Over Abortion, 
270 JAMA, 2871, 2873 (1993). 
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2814. 
95. 112 S. Ct. at 2814. 
96. 112 S. Ct. at 2815. 
97. 112 S. Ct. at 2815. 
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the claim of Robert Dahl, Richard Funston, and others that the 
Supreme Court is molded by popular opinion.98 Dahl's landmark 
1957 study found that the Court was hardly ever successful "in 
blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a ma- 
jor policy."99 Rather, with the appointments-confirmation process 
enabling the elected branches to place on the Court individuals 
whose political philosophies comport with majoritarian preferences, 
Dahl concludes that "policy views dominant on the Court are never 
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law- 
making majorities of the United States."100 Funston's 1975 study 
builds upon this theme. Arguing that only "during transitional peri- 
ods, in which the Court is a holdover from the old coalition, [will] 
the Court ... perform the counter-majoritarian functions ascribed 
to it by traditional theory,"l01 Funston concludes that the Court is 
typically a yea-saying branch. "The hypothesis, in other words, is 
that, as Mr. Dooley so cryptically put it, 'the Supreme Court follows 
the election returns.' "102 
There is little doubt that the Court is sensitive to politics. The 
abortion dispute, however, stands as a counterexample to Dahl and 
Funston's broader claims about judicial compliance with lawmaking 
majorities. To begin with, the Court has spoken with a 
countermajoritarian voice throughout the abortion controversy. 
Roe v. Wade invalidated forty-six state laws. From Roe to Webster, 
the Court withstood an onslaught of state antiabortion measures, 
striking most of them down and extending its reasoning in Roe.103 
Although the Court approved federal and state efforts to limit 
abortion through appropriations and other indirect restrictions, the 
Court never backed away from its conclusion that a woman has a 
constitutionally protected right to terminate her pregnancy. Casey, 
while severely limiting Roe, nonetheless reaffirmed Roe's "central 
98. See Beverly B. Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 
567 (1977); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and 
Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 795 (1975). 
99. Dahl, supra note 98, at 286. 
100. Id. at 285. 
101. Funston, supra note 98, at 796. 
102. Id. For the classic argument that the Court's principal function is to provide legiti- 
macy to governmental conduct by upholding it as constitutional, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960). 
103. While many of these antiabortion measures were the triumph of well-organized and 
intensely interested political minorities over a prochoice majority that left it to the courts to 
protect their interests, it is nonetheless true that these measures were enacted through the 
"majoritarian" political process. Consequently, although Court decisions striking down these 
abortion restrictions may have matched public opinion, these Court decisions - like any decision striking down the action of elected majorities - were technically 
countermajoritarian. 
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[countermajoritarian] holding."104 In so doing, Casey invalidated a 
spousal notification provision that has wide public-opinion 
support.105 
It is nonetheless incorrect to view the abortion dispute as the 
triumph of law over politics. The Court has approved a broad 
range of indirect restrictions on abortion rights and has significantly 
moderated its Roe v. Wade holding. Much like elected govern- 
ment's refusal to challenge Court decisionmaking authority directly, 
the Court too seems respectful of elected government participation 
in the shaping of constitutional values. Liberty and Sexuality errs in 
not recognizing the interactive nature of constitutional decision- 
making by failing to examine the ways in which elected government 
and the courts have shaped each other. Liberty and Sexuality is 
somewhat misleading in depicting the relationship between the 
Court and elected government in linear adversarial terms. While 
that depiction goes a long way in explaining the pre-Roe period, 
which is the principal focus of Garrow's study, the Roe to Casey 
period - which is clearly a part of Garrow's study - tells a much 
different story. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A permanent feature of our constitutional landscape is the 
ongoing tug and pull between elected government and the courts. 
Without question, social and political forces "set[ ] the boundaries 
for judicial activity and influence[ ] the substance of specific deci- 
sions, if not immediately then within a few years."'06 The Supreme 
Court's repudiation of the trimester standard as well as its approval 
of abortion funding restrictions and Reagan-era regulatory initia- 
tives are therefore very much a part of "what Roe really repre- 
sents."l07 At the same time, by "placing issues on the agenda of 
public opinion and of other political institutions [and] providing an 
imprimatur of legitimacy to one side or another,"108 Court action 
affects majoritarian preferences. Roe makes clear how influential 
Court decisions can be. It served as a benchmark in constitutional 
deliberations undertaken by elected government. More strikingly, 
Webster and Casey's noneventful aftermath reveals that Roe shaped 
political attitudes toward abortion rights. 
David Garrow's Liberty and Sexuality demonstrates Roe's mon- 
umental impact in making abortion rights a reality. Without deci- 
104. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992). 
105. Blendon et al., supra note 93, at 2873. 
106. Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. POL. SCI. 7, 8 (1987). 
107. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, supra note 11. 
108. Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. 
ScI. REV. 50, 63 (1976). 
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sions like Griswold and Roe, there is little reason to think that the 
1960s abortion reform movement would have succeeded. Liberty 
and Sexuality drives this point home. Its thoroughgoing history of 
pre-Roe politics is an achievement in and of itself - effectively re- 
butting Robert Bork's suggestion that Griswold was superfluous as 
well as the claims of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gerald Rosenberg, and 
others that Roe did less to help the cause of reproductive autonomy 
than people commonly suppose. 
Liberty and Sexuality, happily, offers much more than a refuta- 
tion of the historical foundations of Griswold's and Roe's critics. 
The book also does a superior job of detailing the history of the 
litigation strategy of the reproductive autonomy movement and the 
deliberations of the Supreme Court Justices sympathetic to the 
cause. While Garrow's focus on the prochoice side of the equation 
makes his history a bit one-sided, he is meticulous and evenhanded 
in telling this side of the story. 
Where Liberty and Sexuality falters is in its failure to consider 
the interactive nature of constitutional decisionmaking, especially 
in the post-Roe era. History makes clear that courts and elected 
government influence each other in significant ways. Garrow's his- 
tory is too Court-centered to recognize these influences. Despite 
this criticism, Liberty and Sexuality is indispensable reading for any- 
one interested in uncovering the story of Roe v. Wade. With Roe's 
landmark status assured, Liberty and Sexuality too will endure as 
the definitive account of the Roe decision and the events leading up 
to it. 
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